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CHAPTERS 
Principles and Sources of 
the Law of Armed Conflict 
5.1 WAR AND THE LAW 
A rticle 2 of the United Nations Charter reguires all nations to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other 
nations. The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force by member 
nations except as an enforcement action taken by or on behalf of the United 
Nations (as in the Gulf War) or as a measure of individual or collective 
self-defense.1 It is important to distinguish between resort to armed conflict, and 
the law governing the conduct of armed co~ct. Regardless of whether the use 
of armed force in a particular circumstance is prohibited by the United Nations 
Charter (and therefore unlawful),2 the manner in which the resulting armed 
1. United Nations Charter, arts. 2(3), 2(4}, 42 & 51-53. These provisions concerning the use 
of force fonn the basis of the modem rules governing the resort to anned conflict, or jus ad bellum. 
See paragraph 4.1.1 and notes 7-9 thereunder (pp. 250 - 253). See also Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the 
Treaty for the Renunciation ofW ar as an Instrument of National Policy, Paris, 27 August 1928, 46 
Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 2 Bevans 732,94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
The relationship concerning resort to war (jus ad bellum), relations between combatant nations 
during war (jus in bello), and the law of neutrality in the late 20th Century, is considered in 
Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modem International Law, 36 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 283 
(1987). See also Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense (2d ed. 1994) at 155-61; Green, The 
Contemporary Law of Anned Conflict (1993) at 59-60. Jus in bello is discussed further in note 4 
(p.290). 
2. Wars violating these principles are often called "aggressive" or "illegal" wars. Military 
personnel may not be lawfully punished simply for fighting in an anned conflict, even if their side is 
clearly the aggressor and has been condemned as such by the United Nations. This rule finds finn 
support in the Allied war crimes trials that followed World War II. For the crime of planning and 
waging aggressive war (defined as a crime against peace, see paragraph 6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343», the 
two post-World War II International Military Tribunals punished only those high ranking civilian 
and military officials engaged in the fonnulation of war-making policy. The twelve subsequent 
Proceeding; at Nuremberg rejected all efforts to punish lesser officials for this crime merely because 
they participated in World War II. See DA Pam 27-161-2, at 221-51. 
Because nations have traditionally claimed that their wars are wars of self-defense, the courts of the 
Western Allies were unwilling to punish officials of the Axis powers for waging aggressive war if 
the officials were not at the policy-making level of government. One of the American tribunals at 
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conflict is conducted continues to be regulated by the law of anned conflict.3 
(For purposes of this publication, the tenn "law of anned conflict" is 
synonymous with "law ofwar.,,)4 
5.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 
The law of anned conflict seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering and 
destruction by controlling and mitigating the hannful effects of hostilities 
2.( ... continued) 
Nuremberg stated, "we cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in the position of being 
compelled to detennine in the heat of war whether his government is right or wrong, or, ifitstarts 
right, when it turns wrong." TIle I.C. Farben Case, 8 TWC 1126,10 LRTWC 39 (1949). 
Since armed force can lawfully be used today only in individual or collective self-defense (or as an 
enforcement action authorized by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter), the unlawful use of armed force constitutes a crime against 
peace under international law . Crimes against peace are defined in art. 6 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and are discussed in paragraph 6.2.5, note 55 
(p.343). 
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg in 1945 empowered 
the Tribunal to try individuals for international crimes, including initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression as a crime against peace. This was confirmed as a principle of international law by the 
U.N. General Assembly in 1946 (Resolution 95(1» and by the International Law Commission in 
1950. In 1974, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by consensus a definition of aggression for use 
by the Security Council in detennining if an act of aggression had been committed: 
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, v.l, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142 (1974); 
Dep't St. Bull., 3 Deb. 1975, at 158-660; AFP 110-20, at 5-78 & 5-79. 
This statement is amplified by a sries of examples of uses of armed force which, unless otherwise 
justified in international law or detennined by the Security Council not to be of sufficient gravity, 
would pennit the Security Council reasonably to consider to qualify as potential acts of aggression. 
Among these examples are invasion, the use of any weapons by a nation against the territory of 
another nation, the imposition of a blockade, an attack by the armed forces of one nation upon the 
armed forces of another nation, or the sending of armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries against 
another State. (See paragraph 7.7 (p. 390) regarding blockade.) Although neither the International 
Military Tribunal judgment nor U.N. General Assembly Resolutions are primary sources of 
international law (see Preface, note 4 (p. 3», they are generally consistent with the current U.S. 
view of aggression. Dep't St. Bull., 3 Feb. 1975, at 155-58. 
3. See paragraph 6.2.5 (war crimes under international law) (p. 343). 
4. Joint Pub. 1-02, at 206. The rules governing the actual conduct of armed conflict are 
variously known as the jus in bello, the law of armed conflict (law of war), or international 
humanitarian law. See paragraph 6.2.2, note 34 (p. 335). 
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4.( ... continued) 
As a matter ofinternational law, application of the law of anned conflict between belligerents does 
not depend on a declaration or other formal recognition of the existence of a state of "war," but on 
whether an "anned conflict" exists, and if so, whether the anned conflict is of an "international" or 
a "noninternational" character. As a matter of national policy, the Anned Forces of the United 
States are required to comply with the law of anned conflict in the conduct of military operations 
and related activities in anned conflict "however such conflicts are characterized." DOD Directive 
5100.77, Subj: DOD LawofWarProgram (in draft as ofl November 1997). See paragraph 5.4.1, 
note 15 (p. 298) regarding the Lieber Code and also paragraph 6.1.2 (p. 324). 
Although itis frequently difficult to determine when a situation involving violent activity becomes 
an "anned conflict," there is general agreement that internal disturbances and tensions are not anned 
conflicts. Examples of internal disturbances and tensions include: 
- riots (i.e., all disturbances which from the start are not directed by a leader and have 
no concetted intent) 
- isolated and sporadic acts of violence (as distinct from military operations carried 
out by anned forces or organized anned groups) 
- other acts of a similar nature (such as mass arrests of persons because of their 
behavior or political opinion). 
GP II, art. 1(2); ICRC, Commentary on the Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, at 133 (1973), quoted in Bothe, Partsch & Solf628 n.9. The 
ICRC Commentary (GP II) (para. 4477, at 1355) distinguishes internal disturbances from internal 
tensions. "Internal disturbances" occur when the State uses anned force to maintain order. 
"Internal tensions" refers to those circumstances when force is used as a preventive measure to 
maintain respect for law and order. 
"International" anned conflicts include cases of declared war or any other anned conflict between 
two or more nations even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. Common article 2. 
All other anned conflicts are "noninternational anned conflicts," governed at least by common 
article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and by GP II for nations bound by it if the situation 
meets the criteria set forth in art. 1 (1) thereof(i.e., there must be an anned conflict occurring in the 
territory of the nation bound by GP II between its anned forces and dissident anned forces or other 
organized anned groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of 
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement GP II). The United States interprets GP II as applying to all conflicts covered by 
common article 3, and encourages all other nations to do likewise. Letter of Transmittal, Jan. 29, 
1987, Senate Treaty Doc. 100-2, at 7. See Annex A5-1 (p. 306). See also International 
Humanitarian Law and Non-InternationalAnned Conflicts, 1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 383-408; 
Levie, The Law of Non-International Anned Conflict (1987). "Anned forces" are discussed in 
paragraph 5.3, note 11 (p. 296). See paragraph 5.4.2, note 34 (p. 303) regarding the U.S. decision 
not to seek ratification of GP I. 
The spectrum of conflict, reflecting the threshhold criteria, is illustrated in Figure A5-1 (p. 314). 
Among recent international anned conflicts are the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Libya-Chad 
War (1987-1988), the China-Vietnam Conflict (1979), and the Soviet-Afghanistan War 
(1979-88). Although some have categorized the latter as an internal conflict in which foreign 
troops participated, others list it as an international conflict. Reisman & Silk, Which Law Applies 
to the Mghan Conflict?, 82 Am.]. Int'l L. 459, 485-86 (1988) (Soviet invasion resisted by loyal 
Mghan govemment troops met the criteria of common article 2(1), and was followed by 
occupation meeting the criteria of common article 2(2)); Roberts, What is Military Occupation?, 
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through minimum standards of protection to be accorded to "combatants" and 
to "noncombatants" and their property.5 (See paragraphs 5.3 and 11.1.) To that 
end, the law of armed conflict provides that: 
1. Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of 
armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with 
a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may be applied.6 
4.( ... continued) 
55 Brit. Y.B. Ind'l L. 249, 278 (1984) (Soviet occupation may well have met the criteria of 
common article 2(2». Certainly the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands War between the United 
Kingdom and Argentina (1982) and the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991 (Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and the U.N.-authorized coalition response-e.g. OPERATION DESERT STORM) 
constituted international armed conflicts. The U.S. has steadfasdy held that the Vietnam War 
(1961-1975) was an international armed conflict. U.S. Department of State, The Legality of 
United States Participation in the Defense ofViet-Nam, 54 Dep't. of State Bull. 474 (March 28, 
1966). For a wide ranging discussion of this issue as it pertains to Vietnam see The Vietnam War 
and International Law, Am. Soc. Int'l L., 4 vols. (Falk ed. 1968-76). Among recent 
non-international armed conflicts are the Nicaraguan Civil War (1979-90), the ongoing Sri Lanka 
Civil War (1983-present), the Chechnya Separatist Conflict (1991-1997), and the Zaire (now 
Congo) Civil War (1997). 
5. As long as war occurs, the law of armed conflict remains an essential body of international 
law. During such strife, the law of armed conflict provides common ground of rationality between 
enemies. This body oflaw corresponds to the mutual interests of belligerents during conflict and 
constitutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end of the conflict. The law of armed conflict 
is intended to preclude purposeless, unnecessary destruction of life and property and to ensure that 
violence is used only to defeat the enemy's military forces. The law of armed conflict inhibits 
warfare from needlessly affecting persons or things of lit de military value. By preventing needless 
cruelty, the bitterness and hatred arising from armed conflict is lessened, and thus it is easier to 
restore an enduring peace. The legal and military experts who attempted to codifY the laws of war 
more than a hundred years ago reflected this when they declared that the final object of an armed 
conflict is the "re-establishment of good relations and a more solid and lasting peace between the 
belligerent States." Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference of27 August 1874, Schindler & 
Toman 26. See also Green, Why is There-The Law ofW ar?, 5 Finn. Y.B. Int'l L. 1994 at 99-148. 
6. This concept, often referred to as the principle of "necessity" or "military necessity," is 
designed to limit the application of military force in armed conflict to that which is in fact required 
to carry out a lawful military purpose. See Bothe, Partsch & Solfat 194-95. Too often, "military 
necessity" is misunderstood and misapplied to support an application of military force that is 
unlawful under the misapprehension that the "military necessity" of mission accomplishment 
justifies that result. TIle Hostages Case (United States v. List et al.), 11 TWC 1253-54 (1950); 
McDougal & Feliciano 523-25; AFP 110-31, at 1-5 & 1-6; FM 27-10, at 3 & 4. See also the 
definition of "military necessity" in de Muliner, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces 
(1987) at Rule 352. In TIle Hostages Case, the Court explained this principle in the follo\vingterrns: 
Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifYing the killing of 
innocent members of the population and the destruction of villages and towns in the 
occupied territory. Military necessity pennits a belligerent, subject to the laws of 
war, to apply any amount and kind offorce to compel the complete submission of 
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. In general, it 
sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the safety of his forces and to 
facilitate the success of his operations. It pennits the destruction of life of armed 
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6.( ... continued) 
enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the 
anned conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of anned enemies and others of 
peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for 
purposes of revenge or the satisfaction of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to 
be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an 
end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable 
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy 
forces. It is lawful to destroy railways,lines of communication, or any other property 
that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and churches even may be 
destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit the wanton 
devastation of a district or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for 
the sake of suffering alone. 
11 TWC 1253-54, quoted in 10 Whiteman 386-87. See also paragraph 6.2.5.5.2 (military necessity) 
(p.356). 
General Eisenhower recognized this distinction in a message on 29 December 1943 from him as 
Allied Commander in the Mediterranean to "all commanders": 
Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted 
principle. But the phrase "military necessity" is sometimes used where it would be 
more truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience. I do 
not want it to cloak slackness or indifference .... 
Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, File 622.610-2, Folder 2, 1944-45, 
quoted in Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II, at 50 (1985) and 
Hapgood & Richardson, Monte Cassino 158 (1984). See also paragraph 8.5.1.6, note 122 (p. 425). 
The principle of military necessity may be, and in many instances is, restricted in its application to 
the conduct ofwarfure by other customary or conventional rules, i.e., military necessity is not a 
justification which supersedes all other laws of armed conflict. The minority view that all rules of 
warfare are subject to, and restricted by, the principle of military necessity has not been accepted by 
the majority of American and English authorities. Furthennore, this opinion has not been accepted 
by military tribunals. Indeed, it has been held by military tribunals that the plea of military necessity 
cannot be considered as a defense for the violation of rules which lay down absolute prohibitions 
(e.g., the rule prohibiting the killing of prisoners of war) and which provide no exception for those 
circumstances constituting military necessity. Thus, one United States Military Tribunal, in 
rejecting the argument that the rules of warfare are always subject to the operation of military 
necessity, stated: 
It is an essence of war that one or the other side must lose and the experienced 
generals and statesmen knew this when they drafted the rules and customs ofland 
warfare. In short, these rules and customs of warfare are designed specifically for all 
phases of war. They comprise the law for such emergency. To claim that they can be 
wantonly-and at the sole discretion of anyone belligerent--disregarded when he 
considers his own situation to be critical, means nothing more or less than to abrogate 
the laws and customs of war entirely. 
TIle Kmpp Trial (Trial if Alfred Felix Alwyn Kmpp von Bohlen und Halbadl and Eleven Others), 10 
LRTWC 139 (1949). 
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2. The employment of any kind or degree of force not required for the purpose of 
the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of 
time, life, and physical resources, is prohibited? 
3. Dishonorable (treacherous) means, dishonorable expedients, and dishonorable 
conduct during armed conflict are forbidden.8 
6. ( ... continued) 
However, there are rules of customary and conventional law which normally prohibit certain acts, 
but which exceptionally allow a belligerent to commit these normally prohibited acts in 
circumstances of military necessity. In conventional rules, the precise fonnulation given to this 
exception varies. Some rules contain the clause that they shall be observed "as fur as military 
necessity (military interests) permits." Examples include GWS, art. 8(3) & GWS-Sea, art. 8(3) 
(restricting activities of representatives or delegates of Protecting Powers); GWS, art. 33(2), 
GWS-Sea, art. 28 (use of captured medical supplies); GWS, art. 32(2) (return of neutral persons); 
GWS, art. 30(1) (return of captured medical and religious personnel); GC, arts. 16(2) (facilitating 
search for wounded and sick), 55(3) (limiting verification of state of food and medical supplies in 
occupied territories), 108(2) (limitations on relief shipments); GWS, art. 42(4), GPW, art. 23(4) 
and GC, art. 18(4) (visibility of distinctive emblems). Other rules permit acts normally forbidden, 
if "required" or "demanded" by the necessities of war. Examples include HR, art. 23(g), GWS, 
art. 34(2) & GC, art. 53 (permitting destruction or seizure of property); GPW, art. 126(2) & GC, 
art. 143(3) (limiting visits of representatives and delegates of Protecting Powers); GC, arts. 49(2) 
(evacuation of protected persons from occupied territory), 49(5) (detention of protected persons 
in areas exposed to dangers of war). Rules providing for the exceptional operation of military 
necessity require a careful consideration of the relevant circumstances to determine whether or not 
the application of otherwise excessive force is rendered necessary in order to protect the safety of a 
belligerent's forces or to facilitate the success ofits military operations. 10 Whiteman 302 (citing 
NWIP 10-2, sec. 220(b». See also paragraph 6.2.3 (p. 335) regarding reprisals. 
7. See FM 27-10, at 3; AFP 110-31, at 1-6. This principle, directed against infliction of 
unnecessary suffering or superflous injury, is referred to as the "principle of proportionality" or the 
"principle of humanity ." The opinion is occasionally expressed that the principles of necessity and 
proportionality contradict each other in the sense that they serve opposing ends. This is not the 
case. The principle of necessity allows the use of sufficient force to accomplish a lawful purpose 
during anned conflict. It complements the principle of proportionality which disallows any kind 
or degree of force not essential for the realization of that lawful purpose. Together, the principles 
of necessity and proportionality make unlawful any use of force which needlessly or unnecessarily 
causes or aggravates human suffering or physical destruction. The real difficulty arises not from the 
actual meaning of the principles, but from their application in practice. 10 Whiteman 302 (citing 
NWIP 10-2, sec. 220 n.9). The rule of proportionality has been arriculated in GP I, arts. 51 (5) (b) 
and 57(2)(a)(iii), as prohibiting attacks 
[W]hich may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 
See Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 Mil. Law 
Rev. 1982 at 91. The tenn "concrete and direct", as used in arts. 51 and 57, refers to "the 
advantage anticipated from the specific military operation of which the attack is a part taken as a 
whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the operation." Bothe, Partsch & Solf311. See 
also Solf, Protection of Civilians 128-35; paragraph 8.1.2.1 and notes 16-20 thereunder (incidental 
injury and collateral damage) (p. 404). 
8. See Chapter 12 and Bothe, Partsch & Solf at 201-207 regarding prohibited deceptions or 
perfidy. 
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The law of armed conflict is not intended to impede the waging of hostilities. 
Its purpose is to ensure that the violence of hostilities is directed toward the 
enemy's forces and is not used to cause purposeless, unnecessary human misery 
and physical destruction. In that sense, the law of armed conflict complements 
and supports the principles of warfare embodied in the military concepts of 
objective, mass, economy of force, surprise, and security. Together, the law of 
armed conflict and the principles of warfare underscore the importance of 
concentrating forces against critical military targets while avoiding the 
expenditure of personnel and resources against persons, places, and things that 
are militarily unimportant.9 However, these principles do not prohibit the 
9. Although the U.S. Navy has not adopted as doctrine the Principles of War, useful 
discussions of their application in naval tactics may be found in Hughes, Fleet Tactics 140-45 & 
290-97 (1986); Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy 108-13 (1965); and Brown, The 
Principles of War, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., June 1949, at 621. The Marine Corps, Anny and Air 
Force have adopted variations of the principles of war as service doctrine: U.S. Marine Corps, 
Marine Rifle Company/Platoon, FMFM 6-4, para. 1403 (1978); U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace 
Doctrine, AFM 1-1, March 1992, vol. II at 9-15; Department of the Anny, Operations, FM 
100-5, at 2-4 to 2-5 (1993); Anned Forces Staff College, Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Pub 1, para. 
101, at p. 1-3 (1993); Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 at 11-1. The 
principles of war in any case are not a set of inflexible rules; rather they are "good tools to sharpen 
the mind," and are essential elements in successful military operations. Eccles 113. 
The principle of tire objedive provides that every military undertaking must have an objective, that 
is, it must be directed toward a clearly defined goal and all activity must contribute to the 
attainment of that goal. Military objectives necessarily support national objectives-in peace as 
well as in war--and, more directly, support the national war aims during conflict. The law of 
armed conflict supports this principle by assisting in defining what is politically and legally 
obtainable. 
The principle of concentration or mass states that to achieve success in war it is essential to concentrate 
superior forces at the decisive place and time in the proper direction, and to sustain this superiority 
at the point of contact as long as it may be required. With the law of armed conflict, this principle 
serves, in part, to employ the proper economy of force at or in the decisive points and to enable 
maximum total effective force to be exerted in achieving the objective. 
Economy offorce means that no more-or less-effortshould be devoted to a task than is necessary to 
achieve the objective. This implies the correct selection and use of weapons and weapon systems, 
maximum productivity from available weapons platforms, and careful balance in the allocation of 
tasks. This principle is consistent with the fundamental legal principle of proportionality. 
Surprise results from creating unexpected situations or from taking courses of least probable 
expectation-both considered from the enemy point of view and both designed to exploit the 
enemy's consequent lack of preparedness. It permits the attaining of maximum effect from a 
minimum expenditure of effort. The lawfulness of such techniques as deception supports surprise. 
Security embraces all measures which must be taken to guard against any form of counter-stroke 
which the enemy may employ to prevent the attainment of the objective or to obtain its own 
objective. Security implies the gaining of enemy intelligence. Surveillance and spying are not 
prohibited by intemationallaw including the law of armed conflict. 
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application of overwhehning force against enemy combatants, units and 
material. 
5.3 COMBATANTS AND NONCOMBATANTS 
The law of armed conflict is based largely on the distinction to be made 
between combatants and noncombatants. In accordance with this distinction, 
the population of a nation engaged in armed conflict is divided into two general 
classes: armed forces (combatants) and the civilian populace (noncombatants). 
Each class has specific rights and obligations in time of armed conflict, and no 
single individual can be simultaneously a combatant and a noncombatant.10 
The term "combatant" embraces those persons who have the right under 
international law to participate directly in armed conflict during hostilities. 
Combatants, therefore, include all members of the regularly organized armed 
forces of a party to the conflict (except medical personnel, chaplains, civil defense 
personnel, and members of the armed forces who have acquired civil defense 
status), as well as irregular forces who are under responsible command and 
subject to internal military discipline, carry their arms openly, and otherwise 
distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population.11 
9.( ... continued} 
Other principles of war are: unity oj command which ensures that all efforts are focused on a 
common goal or objective; maneuverwhlch seeks to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage 
through the flexible application of combat power; and qffensive which, contemplates seizing, 
retaining and exploiting the initiative. 
10. 10 Whiteman 135 (citing NWIP 10-2, para. 221a). Chapter 11 discusses noncombatants in 
detail. See HR, art. 3(2}; GP I, art. 43(2}. 
11. The "armed forces" of a Party to an armed conflict include all organized armed forces, 
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its 
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by 
an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter 
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. GP I, 
art. 43(1}. Other requirements for combatant status are discussed in paragraph 11.7 (p. 489), 
especially notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text. See also de Preux, Synopsis VII: Combatant and 
prisoner-of-war status, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 43. 
Persons acting on their own in fighting a private war, including gangs of terrorists acting on their 
own behalf and not linked to an entity subject to international law, are not lawful combatants. See 
paragraph 12.7.1 (p. 515), and Baxter, So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas and 
Saboteurs, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 323 (1951), regarding illegal combatants. 
On identification of combatants and noncombatants, see de Preux, Synopsis IV: 
Identification-Fundamental Principle, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 364. For a discussion of the 
obligation of members of an irregular force to carry their arms openly and otherwise distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population, see paragraph 11.7 and note 53 thereunder (p. 491). On 
respect for persons protected by the Geneva Conventions, see Green, Contemporary Law of 
Armed Conflict, 1993, chaps. 10 & 11; de Preux, Synopsis IX: Respect for the Human Being in 
the Geneva Conventions, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 217. 
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Conversely, the term "noncombatant" is primarily applied to those 
individuals who do not form a part of the armed forces and who otherwise refrain 
from the commission or direct support of hostile acts. In this context, 
noncombatants and, generally, the civilian population, are synonymous. The 
term noncombatants may, however, also embrace certain categories of persons 
who, although members of or accompanying the armed forces, enjoy special 
protected status, such as medical officers, corpsmen, chaplains, technical (i.e., 
contractor) representatives, and civilian war correspondents. (See Chapter 11.) 
The term is also applied to armed forces personnel who are unable to engage in 
combat because of wounds, sickness, shipwreck, or capture.12 
Under the law of armed conflict, noncombatants must be safeguarded against 
injury not incidental to military operations directed against combatant forces and 
other military objectives. In particular, it is forbidden to make noncombatants 
the object of attack. 13 
Because only combatants may lawfully participate directly in armed combat, 
noncombatants that do so are acting unlawfully and are considered illegal 
combatants. See paragraphs 11.5 (Medical Personnel and Chaplains) and 12.7.1 
(illegal Combatants). 
5.4 SOURCES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
As is the case with international law generally, the principal sources of the law 
of armed conflict are custom, as reflected in the practice of nations, and 
. . al 14 mternatlon agreements. 
5.4.1 Customary Law. The customary international law of armed conflict 
derives from the practice of military and naval forces in the field, at sea, and in the 
air during hostilities. When such a practice attains a degree of regularity and is 
accompanied by the general conviction among nations that behayior in 
conformity with that practice is obligatory, it can be said to have become a rule of 
customary law binding upon all nations. It is frequently difficult to determine the 
12. 10 Whiteman 135, dting NWIP 10-2, para. 221a n.12; Kalshoven, Noncombatant 
Persons, in Robertson, at 304-24; Green, note 11, at chap. 12. See paragraph 11.1 (p. 481). 
13. 10 Whiteman 135, dting NWIP 10-2. para. 221b; Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons, in 
Robertson, at 306-07. See paragraph 11.2 (protected status) (p. 481). For a discussion ofGP I arts. 
48 & 51, see Bothe, Partsch & Solf at 280-86 & 296-318. 
14. See Prefuce (p. 3). Evidence of the law of armed conflict may also be found in national 
military manuals,judicial decisions, the writings of publicists, and the work of various international 
bodies. Documents on the Laws ofWar 6-9 (Roberts & GueIff eds., 2d ed. 1989). With regard to 
the importance of national military manuals as evidence of the law of armed conflict, see Reisman 
& Lietzau, Moving International Law from Theory to Practice: the Role of Military Manuals in 
Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict, in Robertson, at 7-9; Green, paragraph 5.3, note 11 
(p. 296), at chap. 2. For a listing of military manuals see Fleck at app. 3. 
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precise point in time at which a usage or practice of warfare evolves into a 
customary rule oflaw. In a period marked by rapid developments in technology, 
coupled with the broadening of the spectrum of conflict to encompass 
insurgencies and state-sponsored terrorism, it is not surprising that nations often 
disagree as to the precise content of an accepted practice of armed conflict and to 
its status as a rule oflaw. This lack of precision in the definition and interpretation 
of rules of customary law has been a principal motivation behind efforts to codify 
the law of armed conflict through written agreements (treaties and 
conventions.) 15 However, the inherent flexibility oflaw built on custom and the 
15. The roots of the present law of armed conflict may be traced back to practices of 
belligerents which arose, and grew gradually, during the latter part of the Middle Ages, primarily as 
a result of the influences of Christianity and chivalry. See Draper, The Interaction of Christianity 
and Chivalry in the Historical Development of the Law of War, 1965, 5 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 3; 
Meron, Henry's Wars and Shakespeare's Laws (1993); Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and 
the Law of War, 86 Am.]. Int'l L. 1 (1992); The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the 
Western World (Howard, Andreopoulus & Shulman eds. 1994) at 27-39. Unlike the savage 
cruelty of former times, belligerents gradually adopted the view that the realization of the 
objectives of war was in no way limited by consideration shown to the wounded, to prisoners, and 
to private individuals who did not take part in the fighting. Progress continued during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hugo Grotius codified the first rules of warfare in his DeJure 
Belli ac Pads in 1642. These rules were widely adopted by nations, partly for ethical reasons, and 
partly because the remnants of chivalry were still influential among aristocratic officers. 
The most important developments in the laws of armed conflict took place in the period after 
1850. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars first introduced the concept of the citizen 
army. While during the 17th and 18th centuries the means of destruction were limited by the 
absence of industrial might and combatants were limited to a small group of professional soldiers, 
the distinction between combatants and noncombatants became blurred as armed forces began to 
rely upon the direct support of those who remained at home. Limitations on the means of 
destruction were also in transition, as by the middle of the 19th century the effect of the industrial 
revolution was beginning to be felt on the batdefield. A combination of the increased killing power 
of artillery, the inadequacy offield medical treatment and the outmoded infantry tactics resulted in 
unprecedented batdefield losses. The public reaction to the particularly harsh experiences of the 
Crimean War (1854-56) and the United States' Civil War, renewed the impetus for the imposition 
of limits on war and demonstrated the need for mOT, precise written rules of the law of armed 
conflict to replace the vague customary rules. The horrors of the Batde ofSolferino in northern 
Italy in 1859 resulted in the formation of the Red Cross movement in 1863. Dunant, The Battle of 
Solferino (1861). (See paragraph 6.2.2 (p. 334) for a description of the ICRC and its activities.) It 
was in this light that the first conventions to aid the sick and wounded were concluded at Geneva in 
1864. (See Pictet, The First Geneva Convention, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 277.) In the United 
States, President Lincoln commissioned Dr. Francis Lieber, then a professor at Columbia College, 
New York City, to draft a code for the use of the Union Army during the Civil War. His code was 
revised by a board of Army officers, and promulgated by President Lincoln as General Orders No. 
100, on 24 April 1863, as the Instructions for the Government ofArrnies of the United States in the 
Field. (See Baxter, The First Modem Codification of the Law ofW ar, 3 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 1963 
at 171; Solf, Protection of Civilians 121; Hoffinan, The Customary Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict: Evidence from the United States Civil War, 1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 322.) The 
(continued ... ) 
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fact that it reflects the actual-albeit constandy evolving-practice of nations, 
underscore the continuing importance of customary international law in the 
development of the law of armed conflict.16 
5.4.2 International Agreements. International agreements, whether 
denominated as treaties, conventions, or protocols, have played a major role in 
the development of the law of armed conflict. Whether codifying existing rules 
of customary law or creating new rules to govern future practice, international 
agreements are a source of the law of armed conflict. Rules oflaw established 
through international agreements are ordinarily binding only upon those nations 
that have ratified or adhered to them. Moreover, rules established through the 
treaty process are binding only to the extent required by the terms of the treaty 
itself as limited by the reservations, if any, that have accompanied its ratification 
15.( ... continued) 
Lieber Code strongly influenced the further codification of the law of anned conflict and the 
adoption of similar regulations by many nations, including the Oxford Manual of 1880; 
Declaration of Brussels of1874; and the United States Naval War Code of1900, and had a great 
influence on the drafters of Hague Convention No. II (1899), replaced by Hague Convention IV 
(1907) regarding the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land. The 1907 Hague Regulations annexed to 
Hague IV have been supplemented by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of 
Civilians in Time ofW ar, the 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar, the 
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1980 Conventional 
Weapons Convention, as amended. The principles of customary international law codified in such 
treaties are identified in the relevant notes to the text. 
In the past half century there has been a marked tendency to include among the sources of the rules 
of warfare certain principles of law adopted by many nations in their domestic legislation. The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice includes within the sources of international law which 
it shall apply, "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Statute of the I.CJ., 
art. 38, para. 1.c. In the judgment rendered in TIle Hostages Case, the United States Military 
Tribunal stated: 
The tendency has been to apply the tenn "customs and practices accepted by 
civilized nations generally, as it is used in international law, to the laws of war only. 
But the principle has no such restricted meaning. It applies as well to fundamental 
principles of justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilized nations 
generally. In detennining whether such a fundamental rule of justice is entitled to be 
declared a principle of international law, an examination of the municipal laws of 
states in the family of nations will reveal the answer. If it is found to have been 
accepted generally as a fundamental rule of justice by most nations in their municipal 
law, its declaration as a rule ofinternationallaw would seem to be fully justified. 
United States v. List et ai., 11 TWC 1235 (1950). 
16. The role of customary international law in developing the law of anned conflict is cogently 
discussed in the introduction to Documents on the Law of War, note 14 (p. 297), at 4-6. See 
Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989) and Meron, The 
Geneva Conventions As Customary Law, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 348 (1987). See also Bruderlein, 
Custom in International Humanitarian Law, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 579. 
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or adherence by individual nations.17 Conversely, to the extent that such rules 
codify existing customary law or otherwise come, over time, to represent a 
general consensus among nations of their obligatory nature, they are binding 
d . alik 18 upon party an non-party natlons e. 
Principal among the international agreements reflecting the development and 
codification of the law of armed conflict are the Hague Regulations of1907, the 
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 21, reprinted in 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 679 
(1969). Numerous multilateral agreements contain a provision similar to that contained in article 
28 of Hague Convention No. XIII (1907) that "The provisions of the present Convention do not 
apply except between the Contracting Powers, and only if all the belligerents are parties to the 
Convention." The effects of this so called "general participation" clause have not been as 
far-reaching as might be supposed. In World Wars I and II and the Korean War, belligerents 
frequently affirmed their intention to be bound by agreements containing the general participation 
clause regardless of whether or not the strict requirements of the clause were actually met. In 
practice, prize courts during and after WW I disregarded the nonparticipation of non-naval 
belligerents. 17le Blood [1922] 1 A.C. 313. 
18. Certain conventions have been generally regarded either as a codification of pre -existing 
customary law or as having come to represent, through widespread observance, rules of law 
binding upon all States. Both the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and for the Far 
East treated the general participation clause in Hague Convention No. IV (1907), Respecting the 
Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, as irrelevant. They also declared that the general principles laid 
down in the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which does 
not contain a general participation clause, were binding on signatories and nonsignatories alike. 
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 83, u.S. Naval War College, International 
Law Documents 1946-1947, at 281-82 (1948); IMTFE,Judgment 28, u.S. Naval War College, 
International Law Documents 1948-49, at 81 (1950). Art. 2, para. 3, of all four 1949 Geneva 
Conventions states: 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present 
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their 
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to 
the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereo£ 
Similar provisions are contained in art. 96 of GP I and art. 7 of the 1980 Conventional Weapons 
Convention, as amended. 
This subject is explored in detail in Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 Am. 
J. Int'l L. 348 (1987); Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989). 
Cf Solf, Protection of Civilians 124, text accompanying nn. 39-41. 
For efforts to identifY those provisions of GP I which codifY existing international law , see Penna, 
Customary International Law and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some Provisions, in Studies and 
Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet 201 
(Swinarski ed. 1984); Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed 
Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA Pac. Bas. LJ. 55-118 (1984) (GP I and II); 
The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College ofLaw Conference on International 
Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. UJ. Int'l L. & Policy 422-28 (1987) (remarks 
of U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser Matheson); Hogue, IdentifYing Customary 
International Law ofWarin Protocol I: A Proposed Restatement, 13 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo LJ. 
279 (1990). 
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Gas Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of 
War Victims, the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, the Biological 
Weapons Convention of1972, and the Conventional Weapons Convention of 
1980. Whereas the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols 
Additional thereto address, for the most part, the protection of victims of war, 
the Hague Regulations, the Geneva Gas Protocol, 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention, Hague Cultural Property Convention, Biological Weapons 
Convention, and the Conventional Weapons Convention are concerned, 
primarily, with controlling the means and methods of warfare.19 The most 
significant of these agreements (for purposes of this publication) are listed 
chronologically as follows: 
1. 1907 HifIe Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
(Hague IV) 
2. 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V)21 
19. The major treaties on naval warfare presently in force date back to 1907, before the large 
scale use of submarines and aircraft in naval operations. The 1936 London Protocol on submarine 
warfare resulted from attempts by traditionalists to require submarines, which at that time generally 
attacked while on the surface, to adhere to rules governing methods of attack applicable to surface 
combatants. See Levie, Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 London Protocol, in 
Grunawalt at 41-48. The GWS-Sea, as supplemented by portions of GP I, develops only the rules 
on the protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea. In large measure, the law of naval 
warfare continues to develop in its traditional manner through the practice of nations ripening into 
customary (as opposed to treaty) law. A series of meetings of experts, sponsored by the 
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy commencing in 1987, led to the San 
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,June 1994. The Manual 
and accompanying explanation of its provisions may be found in San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Prepared by International Lawyers and 
Naval ExpertS Convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (Doswald-Beck ed. 
1995). See Robertson, An International Manual for the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, Duke L. 
Mag., Winter 1995, at 14-18. 
':I:he military F. •. m:..::!:; o:! n'1::'11 warfare ,,,'!re, until recently, antiquated. See U.S. Navy, Law of 
Naval Warfare, NWIP 10-2 (195~) (set vut in its entirety in the appendix to Tucker), which was 
repJaLed by the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NWP 9 (1987), NWP 
9 ReVlSllJ"l A/FMFM 1-10 (1989) (set out in its entirety in the Appendix to Robertson) and this 
presentIru n.lal. See also chaps. 8-11 of the Royal Australian Navy, Manual of the Law of the Sea, 
ABR 5179 (1~113). New manuals on the law of naval warfare have been recently promulgated or 
are in preparation by a number of other nations, including the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, Italy. ::or!. Russia. 
20. The general prinCIples of Hague IV reflect customary international law. See cases cited in 
note 18 (p. 300), and Solf, Protection of Civilians 123 text at n.41. Hague IV is discussed in 
Chapters 8, 9, 11 & 12 passim. But see Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, in Robertson, at 130. 
21. Hague V is discussed in Chapter 7 (The Law of Neutrality). 
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3. 1907 Hague Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine 
Contact Mines (Hague VIII)22 
4. 1907 Hague Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in 
Time of War (Hague IX)23 
5. 1907 Hague Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the 
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (Hague XI)24 
6. 1907 Hague Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral 
Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII)25 
7. 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asph:trating, 
Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 6 
8. 1936 London Protocol in Regard to the Operations of Submarines or Other 
War Vessels with Respect to Merchant Vessels (part IV of the 1930 London Naval 
27 
Treaty) 
9. 1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Fiell
28 
10. 1949 Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea *29 
11. 1949 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
*30 
War 
22. Hague VIII is discussed in paragraphs 9.2 (naval mines) (p. 441) and 9.4 (torpedoes) 
(p.9-14). 
23. Hague IX is discussed in paragraphs 8.5 (bombardment) (p. 422) and 11.9.3 (Hague 
symbol) (p. 498). 
24. Hague XI is mentioned in paragraph 8.2.3, notes 72, 74, & 78 (pp. 417 and 418). 
25. Hague XIII is discussed in Chapter 7. 
26. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol is discussed in paragraph 10.3 (chemical weapons) (p.466). 
27. The 1936 London Protocol is discussed in paragraphs 8.2.2.2 (destruction of enemy 
merchant vessels) (p. 410) and 8.3.1 (submarine warfare) (p. 419). 
28. The 1949 Geneva Wounded and Sick Convention is discussed in paragraph 11.4 
(wounded, sick and shipwrecked) (p. 484). See Table A5-1 (p. 315) for a listing of the nations that 
are party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, I, II, III and IV. 
29. The 1949 Geneva Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Convention is discussed in paragraph 
11.4 (wounded, sick and shipwrecked) (p. 484). 
30. The general principles (but not the details) of the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War 
Convention, which are repeated in the 1949 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, have been 
held to be declaratory of customary intemationallaw. See note 18 (p. 300); FM 27-10, para. 6. The 
1949 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention is discussed in paragraph 11.7 (prisoners of war) 
(p.489). 
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12. 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
. T· fW *31 In nne 0 ar 
13. 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event 
of anned conflict
32 
14. 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 




15. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims ofIntemational Armed Conflict (Additional Protocol 
I) *34 
31. The 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention is discussed in paragraph 11.8 (interned persons) 
(p.495). 
32. The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and the 1935 Roerich Pact are discussed 
in paragraph 11.9.2 (other protective symbols) (p. 497). 
33. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention is discussed in paragraph lOA (biological 
weapons) (p. 477). 
34. The President decided not to submit GP I to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
ratification. 23 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 91 (29 Jan. 1987), 81 Am.]. Int'l L. 910. France 
(Schindler & Toman 709) and Israel have also indicated their intention not to ratifY GP 1. The U.S. 
position on GP I is set forth in Senate Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, reprinted in 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 561 
(1987) and Annex AS-l (p. 306). Other sources opposing U.S. ratification include Roberts, The 
New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification of Additional Protocol I, 26 Va.]. Int'l 
L. 109 (1985); Feith, Law in the Service of Terror-The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 
1 The National Interest, Fall 1985, at 36; Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 Foreign Affairs, 
Summer 1986, at 901; Feith, Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 Akron L. Rev. 531 
(1986); The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on 
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U J. Int'l L. & Policy 460 (1987) 
(remarks of U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser Sofaer); Sofaer, The Rationale for the United 
States Decision, 82 Am.]. Int'l L. 784 (1988); Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F.L. Rev. 
1,89-225 (1990). Contra, Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Law of War: A Reply to 
Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva ProtocolI, 26 Va.]. Int'l L. 693 (1986); Solf, Protection of Civilians 
Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1 Am. 
Univ.]. Int'l L. & Policy 117 (1986); Solf, A Response to Douglas]. Feith's Law in the Service of 
Terror-The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 20 Akron L. Rev. 261 (1986); Gasser, 
Prohibition of Terrorist Acts in International Humanitarian Law, 26 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 200, 
210-212 (Jul.-Aug. 1986); Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 Am.]. Int'l 
L. 912 (1987); Gasser, Letter to the Editor in Chief, 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 345 (1989); Bagley, 11 Loy. 
L.A. Int'l & Compo LJ. 439 (1989); Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification of Additional 
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 Am.]. Int'l L. 1 (1991). See also Levie, The 1977 
Protocoll and the United States, 38 St. Louis U. Law]. 469 (1994), reprinted in Schmitt & Green at 
chap. XVII. 
As of15 October 1997,147 nations were party to GP I, including NATO members Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and 
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16. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating 
to the Protection ofVictirns of Non-International Anned Conflicts (Additional 
*35 Protocol II) 
17. 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
h I di .. Effc *36 ave n scrumnate ects 
34.( ... continued) 
Spain; the Republic of Korea; Australia; New Zealand; Russia and the fonner Warsaw Pact 
nations; Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland (each of which has proclaimed itselfas neutral 
under the doctrine of penn anent neutrality); as well as China, Cuba, DPRK and Libya. GP I is in 
force as between those nations party to it. See the complete listing at Table A5-1 (p. 315). 
The travaux preparatoires ofGP I are organized by article and published in Levie, Protection ofWar 
Victims: Protocoll to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (4 vols. 1979-81 and Supp.). See also Bothe, 
Partsch & Solfat 1-603, and ICRC, Commentary (GP I) 19-1304. 
It is important that U.S. military operational lawyers are aware that U.S. coalition partners in a 
future conflict will likely be party to GP I and bound by its terms. See also Matheson, note 18 
(p. 300) and Annex A5-1 (final paragraph ofp. 308). 
35. The President submitted GP II to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on 29 
January 1987. Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-2,23 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 91; 26 Int'lLeg. Mat'ls 561 
(1987), Annex A5-1 (p. 306). The proposed statements of understanding and reservations to GP II 
are analyzed in Smith, New Protections for Victims ofInternational [sic] Anned Conflicts: The 
Proposed Ratification of Protocol II by the United States, 120 Mil. L. Rev. 59 (1988). 
36. The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, reprinted in 19 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1524 
(1980); AFP 110-20 at 3-177, is discussed in paragraphs 9.1.1 (undetectable fragments) (p. 438), 
9.3 (land mines) (p. 448), 9.6 (booby traps and other delayed action devices) (p. 451), 9.7 
(incendiary weapons) (p. 452) and 9.8 (directed energy devices) (p. 452). The Convention 
originally included three separate protocols, e.g., Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragements 
(Protocol I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices (Protocol II); and Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Incendiary Weapons (protocol III). The United States became party to the Convention and 
Protocols I and II on 24 September 1995, but declined to ratify Protocol III at that time. At the First 
Review Conference (September 1995-May 1996), Protocol II was substantially amended and a 
new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) was adopted. On 5 January 1997, 
President Clinton submitted the amended Protocol II, the original Protocol III (with a 
reservation), and new Protocol IV to the Senate for its advice and consent to their ratification. See 
notes 36, 44 & 45 accompanying paragraphs 9.3 (land mines) (p. 448), 9.7 (incendiary weapons) 
(p. 452) and 9.8 (directed energy devices) (p. 453). See also Nash, Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law, 91 Am.]. Int'l L. 325 (1997). As of15 October1997, 
71 nations, including the U.S., u.K., Germany, Italy, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, 
Australia,Japan, China, Russia and other ex-Warsaw Pact nations, and the neutral nations, have 
ratified the Conventional Weapons Convention (and two or more of its four protocols), and it is in 
force as between those nations with respect to commonly ratified protocols. (For a current listing 
of parties to the Convention and its Protocols see www.icrc.ch/icrcnews). 
The travaux preparatoires of the "umbrella" treaty and Protocol I (non-detectable fragments) are set 
forth in Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian 
Law?, 105 Mil. L. Rev. 1; of Protocol II (land mines) in Carnahan, The Law of Land Mine 
Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, id. at 
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18. 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction?7 
An asterisk (*) indicates that signature or ratification of the United States was 
subject to one or more reservations or understandings. The United States is a 
party to, and bound by, all of the foregoing conventions and protocols, except 
numbers 13, 15, 16 and 18. The United States has decided not to ratify number 
15 (Additional Protocol 1).38 The United States has ratified number 17, 
Protocols I and II, but has not ratified Protocol III. 
5.5 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT39 
During wartime or other periods of armed conflict, U.S. rules of engagement 
reaffirm the right and responsibility of the operational commander generally to 
seek out, engage, and destroy enemy forces consistent with national objectives, 
strategy, and the law of armed conflict.40 
36.( ... continued) 
73; and of Protocol III (incendiary weapons) in Parks, The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, 30 
Int'l Rev. Red Cross 535 (Nov.-Dec. 1990). See also Fenrick, The Law of Anned Conflict: The 
CUSHIE Weapons Treaty, 11 Can. DeE Q., Sununer 1981, at 25; Fenrick, New Developments 
in the Law Concerning the Use ofConventionaI Weapons in Anned Conflict, 19 Can. Y.B. Int'l 
L. 229 (1981); Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention: Implication for the American 
Soldier, 24 A.F.L. Rev. 279 (1984); Rogers, A Conunentary on the Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 26 Mil. L. & L. of War Rev. 
185 (1987); and Symposium, Tenth Anniversary of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 30 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 469-577 
(Nov.-Dec. 1990). 
37. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention has since been ratified by the U.S. (24 April 
1997). The Convention is discussed in paragraph 10.3.1.2 (p. 10-13). 
38. Six of the 1907 Hague Conventions entered into force for the U.S. in 1909, while the four 
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 entered into force for the United States in 1956. The 
Administration is reconsidering whether to submit the 1954 Hague Cultural Property 
Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. 
39. See Preface and paragraph 4.3.2.2 (p. 263). 
40. Accordingly, wartime rules of engagement may include restrictions on weapons and 
targets, and provide guidelines to ensure the greatest possible protection for noncombatants 
consistent with military necessity. Roach, Rules of Engagement, Nav. War Coll. Rev.,Jan.-Feb. 
1983, at 49; Phillips, ROE: A Primer, Anny Lawyer, July 1993 at 21-23; GrunawaIt, The JCS 
Standing Rules ofEngagement: AJudgeAdvocate's Primer, 42 Air Force Law Rev. 245 (1997). 
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ANNEX AS-l 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL AND LETTER OF SUBMITTAL 
RELATING TO PROTOCOL II ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949. 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 
The White House,January 29, 1987. 
To the Senate if the United States 
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, 
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
concluded at Geneva onJune 10, 1977. I also enclose for the information of the 
Senate the report of the Department of State on the Protocol. 
The United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify 
and improve the international rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict, with 
the objective of giving the greatest possible protection to victims of such 
conflicts, consistent with legitimate military requirements. The agreement that I 
am transmitting today is, with certain exceptions, a positive step toward this goal. 
Its ratification by the United States will assist us in continuing to exercise 
leadership in the international community in these matters. 
The Protocol is described in detail in the attached report of the Department of 
State. Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is essentially an expansion of 
the fundamental humanitarian provisions contained in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions with respect to non-international armed conflicts, including 
humane treatment and basic due process for detained persons, protection of the 
wounded, sick and medical units, and protection of noncombatants from attack 
and deliberate starvation. If these fundamental rules were observed, many of the 
worst human tragedies of current internal armed conflicts could be avoided. In 
particular, among other things, the mass murder of civilians is made illegal, even 
if such killings would not amount to genocide because they lacked racial or 
religious motives. Several Senators asked me to keep this objective in mind when 
adopting the Genocide Convention. I remember my commitment to them. 
This Protocol makes clear that any deliberate killing of a noncombatant in the 
course of a non-international armed conflict is a violation of the laws of war and a 
crime against humanity, and is therefore also punishable as murder. 
While I recommend that the Senate grant advice and consent to this 
agreement, I have at the same time concluded that the United States cannot ratify 
a second agreement on the law of armed conflict negotiated during the same 
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period. I am referring to Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
which would revise the rules applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all 
other efforts associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross, this 
agreement has certain meritorious elements. But Protocol I is fundamentally and 
irreconcilably flawed. It contains provisions that would undermine 
humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war. One of its provisions, f<;>r 
example, would automatically treat as an international conflict any so-called 
"war of national liberation." Whether such wars are international or 
non-international should tum exclusively on objective reality, not on one's view 
of the moral qualities of each conflict. To rest on such subjective distinctions 
based on a war's alleged purposes would politicize humanitarian law and 
eliminate the distinction between international and non-international conflicts. 
It would give special status to "wars of national liberation," an ill-defined 
concept expressed in vague, subjective, politicized terminology. Another 
provision would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not 
satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would endanger 
civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal 
themselves. These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot be 
remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to submit the 
Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would invite an expression of the sense 
of the Senate that it shares this view. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also 
concluded that a number of the provisions of the Protocol are militarily 
unacceptable. 
It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would have preferred to 
ratify such a convention, which as I said contains certain sound elements. But we 
cannot allow other nations of the world, however numerous, to impose upon us 
and our allies and friends an unacceptable and thoroughly distasteful price for 
joining a convention drawn to advance the laws of war. In fact, we must not, and 
need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for 
progress in humanitarian law. 
The time has come for us to devise a solution for this problem, with which the 
United States is from time to time confronted. In this case, for example, we can 
reject Protocol I as a reference for humanitarian law, and at the same time devise 
an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of 
real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed 
conflicts. We are therefore in the process of consulting with our allies to develop 
appropriate methods for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules 
that govern our military operations, and as customary international law. I will 
advise the Senate of the results of this initiative as soon as itis possible to do so. 
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I believe that these actions are a significant step in defense of traditional 
humanitarian law and in opposition to the intense efforts of terrorist 
organizations and their supporters to promote the legitimacy of their aims and 
practices. The repudiation of Protocol I is one additional step, at the ideological 
level so important to terrorist organizations, to deny these groups legitimacy as 
international actors. 
Therefore, I request that the Senate act prompdy to give advice and consent to 
the ratification of the agreement I am transmitting today, subject to the 
understandings and reservations that are described more fully in the attached 
report. I would also invite an expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares 
the view that the United States should not ratify Protocol I, thereby reaffirming 
its support for traditional humanitarian law, and its opposition to the 
politicization of the law by groups that employ terrorist practices. 
RONALD REAGAN 
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THE PRESIDENT 
The White House. 
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
Washin~ton, December 13, 1986. 
THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to 
transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, Protocol II 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949, concluded at Geneva 
onJune 10, 1977. 
PROTOCOL II 
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was negotiated by diplomatic 
conference convened by the Swiss Government in Geneva, which met in four 
annual sessions from 1974-77. This Protocol was designed to expand and refine 
the basic humanitarian provisions contained in Article 3 common to the four 
1949 Geneva Conventions with respect to non-international conflicts. While 
the Protocol does not (and should not) attempt to apply to such conflicts all the 
protections prescribed by the Conventions for international armed conflicts, 
such as prisoner-of-war treatment for captured combatants, it does attempt to 
guarantee that certain fundamental protections be observed, including: (1) 
humane treatment for detained persons, such as protection from violence, 
torture, and collective punishment; (2) protection from intentional attack, 
hostage-taking and acts of terrorism of persons who take no part in hostilities, (3) 
special protection for children to provide for their safety and education and to 
preclude their participation in hostilities, (4) fundamental due process for persons 
against whom sentences are to be passed or penalties executed; (5) protection and 
appropriate care for the sick and wounded, and medical units which assist them; 
and (6) protection of the civilian population from military attack, acts of terror, 
deliberate starvation, and attacks against installations containing dangerous 
forces. In each case, Protocol II expands and makes more specific the basic 
guarantees of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. Its specific provisions 
are described in greater detail in the attached section-by-section analysis. 
The final text of Protocol II did not meet all the desires of the United States 
and other western delegations. In particular, the Protocol only applies to internal 
conflicts in which dissident armed groups are under responsible command and 
exercise control over such a part of the national territory as to carry out sustained 
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and concerted military operations. This is a narrower scope than we would have 
desired, and has the effect of excluding many internal conflicts in which dissident 
armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct sporadic guerrilla 
operations over a wide area. We are therefore recommending that u.s. 
ratification be subject to an understanding declaring that the United States will 
apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the 1949 
Conventions (and only such conflicts), which will include all non-international 
armed conflicts as traditionally defined (but not internal disturbances, riots and 
sporadic acts of violence). This understanding will also have the effect of treating 
as non-international these so-called "wars of national liberation" described in 
Article 1 (4) of Protocol I which fail to meet the traditional test of an international 
conflict. 
Certain other reservations or understandings are also necessary to protect u.s. 
military requirements. Specifically, as described in greater detail in the attached 
annex, a reservation to Article 10 is required to preclude the possibility that it 
might affect the administration of discipline of U.S. military personnel under 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, under the guise of protecting persons 
purporting to act in accordance with "medical ethics." However, this is 
obviously not intended in any way to suggest that the United States would 
deliberately deny medical treatment to any person in need of it for political 
reasons or require U.S. medical personnel to perform procedures that are 
unethical or not medically indicated. 
Also, we recommend an understanding with respect to Article 16 to confirm 
that the special protection granted by that article is required only for a limited 
class of objects that, because of their recognized importance, constitute a part of 
the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and that such objects will lose their 
protection if they are used in support of the military effort. This understanding is 
generally shared by our allies, and we expect it to appear in the ratification 
documents of many of them. 
Finally, we recommend an understanding to deal with any situation in which 
the United States may be providing assistance to a country which has not ratified 
Protocol II and would therefore feel under no obligation to comply with its 
terms in the conduct of its own operations. Our recommended understanding 
would make clear that our obligations under the Protocol would not exceed 
those of the State being assisted. The United States would of course comply with 
the applicable provisions of the Protocol with respect to all operations conducted 
by its own armed forces. 
With the above caveats, the obligations contained in Protocol II are no more 
than a restatement of the rules of conduct with which U.S. military forces would 
almost certainly comply as a matter of national policy, constitutional and legal 
protections, and common decency. These obligations are not uniformly 
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observed by other States, however, and their universal observance would 
mitigate many of the worst human tragedies of the type that have occurred in 
internal conflicts of the present and recent past. I therefore strongly recommend 
that the United States ratify Protocol II and urge all other States to do likewise. 
With our support, I expect that in due course the Protocol will be ratified by the 
great majority of our friends, as well as a substantial preponderance of other 
States. 
The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice have also conducted a 
thorough review of a second law-of-war agreement negotiated during the same 
period-Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949. 
This Protocol was the main object of the work of the 1973-77 Geneva 
diplomatic conference, and represented an attempt to revise and update in a 
comprehensive manner the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of war 
victims, the 1907 Hague Conventions on means and methods of warfare, and 
customary international law on the same subjects. 
Our extensive interagency review of the Protocol has, however, led us to 
conclude that Protocol I suffers from fundamental shortcomings that cannot be 
remedied through reservations or understandings. We therefore must 
recommend that Protocol I not be forwarded to the Senate. The following is a 
brief summary of the reasons for our conclusion. 
In key respects Protocol I would undermine humanitarian law and endanger 
civilians in war. Certain provisions such as Article 1 (4), which gives special status 
to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination 
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of 
self-determination," would inject subjective and politically controversial 
standards into the issue of the applicability of humanitarian law. Protocol I also 
elevates the international legal status of self-described "national liberation" 
groups that make a practice of terrorism. This would undermine the principle 
that the rights and duties of international law attach principally to entities that 
have those elements of sovereignty that allow them to be held accountable for 
their actions, and the resources to fulfill their obligations. 
Equally troubling is the easily inferred political and philosophical intent of 
Protocol I, which aims to encourage and give legal sanction not only to "national 
liberation" movements in general, but in particular to the inhumane tactics of 
many of them. Article 44(3), in a single subordinate clause, sweeps away years of 
law by "recognizing" that an armed irregular "cannot" always distinguish 
himself from non-combatants; it would grant combatant status to such an 
irregular anyway. As the essence of terrorist criminality is the obliteration of the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, it would be hard to square 
ratification of this Protocol with the United States' announced policy of 
combatting terrorism. 
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The Joint ChiefS of Staff have conducted a detailed review of the Protocol, 
and have concluded that it is militarily unacceptable for many reasons. Among 
these are that the Protocol grants guerrillas a legal status that often is superior to 
that accorded to regular forces. It also unreasonably restricts attacks against 
certain objects that traditionally have been considered legitimate military targets. 
It fails to improve substantially the compliance and verification mechanisms of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and eliminates an important sanction against 
violations of those Conventions. Weighing all aspects of the Protocol, the Joint 
ChiefS of Staff found it to be too ambiguous and complicated to use as a practical 
guide for military operations, and recommended against ratification by the 
United States. 
We recognize that certain provision of Protocol I reflect customary 
international law, and others appear to be positive new developments. We 
therefore intend to consult with our allies to develop appropriate methods for 
incorporating these provisions into rules that govern our military operations, 
with the intention that they shall in time win recognition as customary 
international law separate from their presence in Protocol L This measure would 
constitute an appropriate remedy for attempts by nations to impose unacceptable 
conditions on the acceptance of improvements in international humanitarian 
law. I will report the results of this effort to you as soon as possible, so that the 
Senate may be advised of our progress in this respect. 
CONCLUSION 
I believe that U.S. ratification of the agreement which I am submitting to you 
for transmission to the Senate, Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, will 
advance the development of reasonable standards of international humanitarian 
law that are consistent with essential military requirements. The same is not true 
with respect to Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and this agreement 
should not be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. We 
will attempt in our consultations with allies and through other means, however, 
to press forward with the improvement of the rules of international humanitarian 
law in international armed conflict, without accepting as the price for such 
improvements a debasement of our values and of humanitarian law itself 
The effort to politicize humanitarian law in support of terrorist organizations 
have been a sorry development. Our action in rejecting Protocol I should be 
recognized as a reaffirmation of individual rights in international law and a 
repudiation of the collectivist apology for attacks on non-combatants. 
Taken as a whole, these actions will demonstrate that the United States 
strongly supports humanitarian principles, is eager to improve on existing 
international law consistent with those principles, and will reject revisions of 
Principles and Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict 313 
intemationallaw that undermine those principles. The Departments of State and 
Justice support these recommendations. 
Respectfully submitted. 
GEORGE P. SHULTZ 
Attachments: 
1-Detailed Analysis of Provisions 
2-Recommended Understanding and Reservations 
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TABLE AS-1 
STATES PARTY TO THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND 
THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS 
AS OF 15 OCTOBER 
1997 
• States party to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions: 188 
• States party to the 1977 
AdditionalProtocolI: 147 
• States having made the 
declaration under Article 
90 of Protocol I: 50 
• States party to the 1977 
Additional Protocol II: 
140 
The following tables show which States were 
party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to 
the two Additional Protocols of 1977, as of 15 
October 1997. They also indicate which States 
had made the optional declaration under Article 
90 of 1977 Protocol I, recognizing the 
competence of the International Fact-Finding 
Commission. The names of the countries given in 
the tables may differ from their official names. 
The dates indicated are those on which the 
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 
received the official instrument from the State that 
was ratifying, acceding to or succeeding to the 
Conventions and Protocols or accepting the 
competence of the International Fact-Finding 
Commission. Apart from the exceptions 
mentioned in the footnotes at the end of the tables, 
for all States the entry into force of the 
Conventions and of the Protocols occurs six 
months after the date given in the present 
document; for States which have made a 
declaration of succession, entry into force takes 
place retroactively, on the day of their accession to 
independence. 
Abbreviations 
Ratification (R): a treaty is generally open for 
signature for a certain time following the conference 
which has adopted it. However, a signature is not 
binding on a State unless it has been endorsed by 
ratification. The time limits having elapsed, the 
Conventions and the Protocols are no longer open for 
signature. The States which have not signed them may 
at any time accede or, where appropriate, succeed to 
them. 
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Accession (A): instead of signing and then ratifying a 
treaty, a State may become party to it by the single act 
called accession. 
Declaration of Succession (S): a newly independent 
State may declare that it will abide by a treaty which was 
applicable to it prior to its independence. A State may 
also declare that it will provisionally abide by such 
treaties during the time it deems necessary to examine 
their texts carefully and to decide on accession or 
succession to some or all of them (declaration of 
provisional application). At present no State is bound by 
such a declaration. 
Reservation/Declaration (RID): a unilateral 
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State 
when ratifying, acceding or succeeding to a treaty, 
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal 
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their 
application to that State (provided that such reservations 
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GENEVA PROTOCOL I PROTOCOL II 
CONVENTIONS 
COUNTRY RIAlS RID RIAlS RID D90 RIAlS RID 
Afglunisl2n 26.09.1956 R 
~I .... Ib:mi, 27.05.1957 R 16.07.1993 .... 16.07.1993 .... Igeri' 20.06.1960 .... 16.08.1989 .... X 16.08.1989 16.08.1989 .... ndam 17.09.1993 .... 
.... ngoh 20.09.1984 .... X 20.09.1984 .... X 
.... ntigu' ,nd B,rbud2 06.10.1986 5 06.10.1986 .... 06.10.1986 .... 
.... rgentina 18.09.1956 R 26.11.1986 .... X 11.10.1996 26.11.1986 .... X 
Armenia 07.06.1993 .... 07.06.1993 .... 07.06.1993 .... 
.... usmli, 14.10.1958 ! R X 121.06.1991 R X 23.09.1992 21.06.1991 R 
Awrril 27.08.1953 I R 113.08.1982 R X 13.08.1982 13.08.1982 R X 
Azerbaijan 01.06.1993 .... 
B,hanus 11.07.1975 5 10.04.1980 .... 10.04.1980 .... 
B,hrain 30.11.197\ .... 30.10.1986 .... 30.10.1986 .... 
B'ngladesh 04.04.1972 5 08.09.1980 .... 08.09.1980 .... 
B,rb,dos 10.09.1968 5 X 19.02.1990 .... 19.02.1990 .... 
Behrus 03.08.1954 I R X 23.10.1989 R 23.10.1989 23.10.1989 RI 
Belgium 03.09.1952 1 R I 20.05.1986 R X 27.03.1987 20.05.1986 R' I 
Belizc 29.06.1984 I .... 29.06.1984 .... 29.06.1984 ....' I Benin 14.12.1961 5 28.05.1986 .... 28.05.1986 .... 1 
Bhul2n 10.01.1991 .... 
~I Bolivi, 10.12.1976 R 08.12.1983 .... 10.08.1992 08.12.1983 Bosnil-Herzegovim 31.12.1976 5 31.12.1992 5 31.12.1992 31.12.1992 
BotsW2f12 29.03.1968 .... 23.05.1979 .... 23.05.1979 .... 
Bruil 29.06.1957 R 05.05.1992 .... 23.11.1993 05.05.1992 .... 
Brunei DU1lSS2hm 14.10.1991 .... 14.10.1991 .... 14.10.1991 .... 
Bulgari, 22.07.1954 R 26.09.1989 R 09.05.1994 26.09.1989 R 
Burkina F2so 07.11.1961 5 20.10.1987 R 20.10.1987 R 
Burundi 27.12.197\ 5 10.06.1993 .... 10.06.1993 .... 
Cambodi, 08.12.1958 .... 
C2meroon 16.09.1963 5 16.03.1984 .... 16.03.1984 .... 
Canad2 14.05.1965 R 20.11.1990 R X 20.11.1990 20.11.1990 R X 
C'peVerdc 11.05.1984 .... 16.03.1995 .... 16.03.1995 16.03.1984 A 
Cenrnl African Republic 01.08.1966 5 17.07.1984 A 17.07.1984 .... 
Chad 05.08.1970 .... 17.01.1997 .... 17.01.1997 .... 
Chile 12.10.1950 R 24.04.1991 R 24.04.1991 24.04.1991 R 
China 28.12.1956 R X 14.09.1983 A X 14.09.1983 A 
Colombi, 08.11.1961 R 01.09.1993 A 17.04.1996 14.08.1995 A 
Comoros 21.11.1985 A 21.11.1985 .... 21.11.1985 .... 
Congu 04.02.1967 5 10.11.1983 A 10.11.1983 A 
COSI2 Rica 15.\0.1969 .... 15.12.1983 .... 15.12.1983 A 
Cotc d'lvoire 28.12.1961 5 20.09.1989 R 20.09.1989 R 
Croatia 11.05.1992 5 11.05.1992 5 11.05.1992 11.05.1992 5 
Cub, 15.04.1954 R 25.11.1982 .... 
Cyprus 23.05.1962 .... 01.06.1979 R 18.03.1996 A 
C:zech Repubbc 05.02.1993 5 X 05.02.1993 5 02.05.1995 05.02.1993 5 
Dennurk 27.06.1951 R 17.06.1982 R X 17.06.1982 17.06.1982 R 
Djibouti 06.03.19781 5 08.04.1991 .... 08.04.1991 A 
Dorninic:a 28.09.1981 5 25.04.1996 .... 25.04.1996 A 
Dominion Republic 22.01.1958 A 26.05.1994 .... 26.05.1994 A 
Ecu,dor 11.08.1954 R 10.04.1979 R 10.04.1979 R 
Egypr 10.11.1952 R 09.10.1992 R X 09.\0.1992 R X 
EI Salvador 17.06.1953 R 23.11.1978 R 23.11.1978 R 
EQu:norial Guineoa 24.07.1986 A 24.07.1986 .... 24.07.1986 A 
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GENEVA PROTOCOL I PROTOCOL II 
CONVENTIONS 
COUNTRY RIAlS RID RIAlS RID D90 RIAlS RID 
Estoma 18.01.1993 A 18.01.1993 A 18.01.1993 A 
Ethiopia 02.10.1969 R 08.04.1994 A 08.04.1994 A 
Fiji 09.08.1971 S 
Finland 22.02.1955 R 07.08.1980 R X 07.08.1980 07.08.1980 R 
France 28.06.1951 R 24.02.19842 A X 
Glbon 26.02.1965 S 08.04.1980 A 08.04.1980 A 
Gamhi .. 20.10.1966 S 12.01.1989 A 12.01.1989 A 
Georgia 14.09.1993 A 14.09.1993 A 14.09.1993 A 
Gemuny 03.09.1954 A X 14.02.1991 R X 14.02.1991 14.02.1991 R X 
Ghana 02.08.1958 A 28.02.19783 R 28.02.19784 R 
Greece 05.06.1956 R 31.03.1989 R 15.02.1993 A 
Grenadl 13.04.1981 S 
Guatenub. 14.05.1952 R 19.10.1987 R 19.10.1987 R 
Guinea 11.07.1984 A 11.07.1984 A 20.12.1993 11.07.1984 A 
Gumea-Biss2u 21.02.1974 A X 21.10.1986 A 21.10.1986 A 
Guyana 22.07.1968 S 18.01.1988 A 18.01.1988 A 
H:uti 11.04.1957 A 
Holy See 22.02.1951 R 21.11.1985 R X 21.11.1985 R X 
Honduras 31.12.1965 A 16.02.1995 R 16.02.1995 R 
Hung>ry 03.08.1954 R X 12.04.1989 R 23.09.1991 12.04.1989 R 
Icel2nd 10.08.1965 A 10.04.1987 R X 10.04.1987 10.04.1987 R 
Inm3 09.11.1950 R 
Indonesia 30.09.1958 A 
Iran (Islamic Rep. oQ 20.02.1957 R X 
Iraq 14.02.1956 A 
Ireland 27.09.1962 R 
Israel 06.07.1951 R X 
1uly 17.12.1951 R 27.02.1986 R X 27.02.1986 27.02.1986 R 
Jam:uCl 20.07.1964 S 29.07.1986 A 29.07.1986 A 
J'pan 21.04.1953 A 
Jortbn 29.05.1951 A 01.05.1979 R 01.05.1979 R 
K, .. khsun 05.05.1992 S 05.05.1992 S 05.05.1992 S 
Kenya 20.09.1996 A 
Kmbati 05.01.1989 S 
Korea (Oem. Peop!e', Rep. oQ 27.08.1957 A X 09.03.1988 A 
Kore, (Republic oQ 16.08.19665 A X 15.01.1982 R X 15.01.1982 R 
Kuwait 02.09.1967 A X 17.01.1985 A 17.01.1985 A 
KYrg)'73"n 18.09.1992 S 18.09.1992 S 18.09.1992 S 
Lto People's Oem. Rep. 29.10.1956 A 18.11.1980 R 18.11.1980 R 
utvi:a 24.12.1991 A 24.12.1990 A 24.12.1991 A 
Lebanon 10.04.1951 R 23.07.1997 A 23.07.1997 A 
Lesotho 20.05.1968 S 20.05.1994 A 20.05.1994 A 
Libena 29.03.1954 A 30.06.1988 A 30.06.1988 A 
LIbyan Arab J,m,hiriy, 22.05.1956 A 07.06.1978 A 07.06.1978 A 
Liechtenstein 21.09.1950 R X 10.08.1989 R X 10.08.1989 10.08.1989 R X 
Llthuam;a 03.10.1996 A 
Luxembourg 01.07.1953 R 29.08.1989 R 12.05.1993 29.08.1989 R 
Macedonia 01.09.1993 S X 01.09.1993 S X 01.09.1993 01.09.1993 S 
M'wg=>r 18.07.1963 S 08.05.1992 R 27.07.1993 08.05.1993 R 
Mabwi 05.01.1968 A 07.10.1991 A 07.10.1991 A 
Mabysia 24.08.1962 A 
M,ldives 18.06.1991 A 03.09.1991 A 03.09.1991 A 
M,li 24.05.1965 A 08.02.1989 A 08.02.1989 A 
M;alta 22.08.1968 S 17.04.1989 A X 17.04.1989 17.04.1989 A X 
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GENEVA PROTOCOL I PROTOCOL II 
CONVENTIONS 
COUNTRY RIAlS RID RIAlS RID D90 RIAlS RID 
Mauritania 30.10.1962 S 14.03.1980 A 14.03.1980 A 
Mauritius 18.08.1970 S 22.03.1982 A 22.03.1982 A 
Mexico 29.10.1952 R 10.03.1983 A 
Micronesia 19.09.1995 A 19.09.1995 A 19.09.1995 A 
MoldoV2 (Republic 01) 24.05.1993 A 24.05.1993 A 24.05.1993 A 
Maruca 05.07.1950 R 
Mongolia 20.12.1958 A 06.12.1995 A X 06.12.1995 06.12.1995 A 
Morocco 26.07.1956 A 
MOZlmbique 14.03.1983 A 14.03.1983 A 
My:mnur 25.08.1992 A 
Namibia 22.08.1991 6 S 17.06.1994 A 21.07.1994 17.06.1994 A 
Nep.1 07.02.1964 A 
Netherhnds 03.08.1954 R 26.06.1987 R X 26.06.1987 26.06.1987 R 
New Zc2hnd 02.05.1959 R X 08.02.1988 R X 08.02.1988 08.02.1988 R 
Niangu. 17.12.1953 R 
Niger 21.04.1964 S 08.06.1979 R 08.06.1979 R 
Nigeri. 20.06.1961 S 10.10.1988 A 10.10.1988 A 
Norway 03.08.1951 R 14.12.1981 R 14.12.1981 14.12.1981 R 
Onun 31.01.1974 A 29.03.1984 A X 29.03.1984 A X 
PakiSl2n 12.06.1951 R X 
P.hu 25.06.1996 A 25.06.1996 A 25.06.1996 A 
PalUnu 10.02.1956 A 18.09.1995 A 18.09.1995 A 
Papua New Guinea 26.05.1976 S 
Pangu.y 23.10.1961 R 30.11.1990 A 30.11.1990 A 
Peru 15.02.1956 R 14.07.1989 R 14.07.1989 R 
Philippines 06.10.19527 R 11.12.1986 A 
Pohnd 26.11.1954 R X 23.10.1991 R 02.10.1992 23.10.1991 R 
Porrug>1 14.03.1961 R X 27.05.1992 R 01.07.1994 27.05.1992 R 
Qatar 15.10.1975 A 05.04.1988 A X 24.09.1991 
Ronunia 01.06.1954 R X 21.06.1990 R 13.05.1995 21.06.1990 R 
Russian Feder2tion 10.05.1954 R X 29.09.1989 R X 29.09.1989 29.09.1989 R X 
RW2nda 05.05.1964 S 19.11.1984 A 08.07.1993 19.11.1984 A 
Saint Kitts :and Nevis 14.02.1986 S 14.02.1986 A 14.02.1986 A 
Saint Luoa 18.09.1981 S 07.10.1982 A 07.10.1982 A 
Sline Vincent & Grcmdincs 01.04.1981 A 08.04.1983 A 08.04.1983 A 
52mo2 23.08.1984 S 23.08.1984 A X 23.08.1984 A 
S:mMarino 29.08.1953 A 05.04.1994 R 05.04.1994 R 
Sao Tome and Principe 21.05.1976 A 05.07.1996 A 05.07.1996 A 
S.udiAnbi. 18.05.1963 A 21.08.1987 A X 
Seneg>1 18.05.1963 S 07.05.1985 R 07.05.1985 R 
SeycheDes 08.11.1984 A 08.11.1984 A 22.05.1992 08.11.1984 A 
Siem. Leone 10.06.1965 S 21.10.1986 A 21.10.1986 A 
Sing>pore 27.04.1973 A 
SloV2o. 02.04.1993 S X 02.04.1993 S 13.03.1995 02.04.1993 S 
Slovenia 26.03.1992 S 26.03.1992 S 26.03.1992 26.03.1992 S 
Solomon Islands 06.07.1981 S 19.09.1988 A 19.09.1988 A 
Sonuli:a 12.07.1962 A 
South Africa 31.03.1952 A 21.11.1995 A 21.11.1995 A 
Sp.in 04.08.1952 R 21.04.1989 R X 21.04.1989 21.04.1989 R 
Sri !.:Inb 28.02.19598 R 
Sudan 23.09.1957 A 
Suriname 13.10.1976 S X 16.12.1985 A 16.12.1985 A 
SW2zihnd 28.06.1973 A 02.11.1995 A 02.11.1995 A 
Sweden 28.12.1953 R 31.08.1979 R X 31.08.1979 31.08.1979 R 
Swil7Crhnd 31.03.19509 R 17.02.1982 R X 17.02.1982 17.02.1982 R 
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GENEVA PROTOCOL I PROTOCOL II 
CONVENTIONS 
COUNTRY RIAlS RID RIAlS RID D90 RIAlS RID 
Syrian Arab Republic 02.11.1953 R 14.11.1983 A X 
T2jikistm 13.01.1993 S 13.01.1993 S 10.09.1997 13.01.1993 S 
Tanzania (United Rep. oQ 12.12.1962 S 15.02.1983 A 15.02.1983 A 
Thailand 29.12.1954 A 
The Former Y.R. Macedonia 01.09.1993 S 01.09.1993 S 01.09.1993 01.09.1993 S 
Togo 06.01.1962 S 21.06.1984 R 21.11.1991 21.06.1984 R 
Tonga 13.04.1978 S 
Trinidad and Tobago 24.09.196310 A 
Tunisia 04.05.1957 A 09.08.1979 R 09.08.1979 R 
Turkey 10.02.1954 R 
Turkmenisun 10.04.1952 S 10.04.1992 S 10.04.1992 S 
TUV2lu 19.02.1981 S 
Uganda 18.05.1964 A 13.03.1991 A 13.03.1991 A 
Uknine 03.08.1954 R X 25.01.1990 R 25.01.1990 25.01.1990 R 
United Anb Emir.nes 10.05.1972 A 09.03.1983 A X 06.03.1992 09.03.1983 A X 
United Kingdom 23.09.1957 R X 
United Stl[CS of America 02.08.1955 R X 
Uruguay 05.03.1969 R X 13.12.1985 A 17.07.1990 13.12.1985 A 
Uzbeldstm 08.10.1993 A 08.10.1993 A 08.10.1993 A 
Vanuatu 27.10.1982 A 28.02.1985 A 28.02.1985 A 
Venezueb 13.02.1956 R 
VlctN:am 28.06.1957 A X 19.10.1981 R 
Yemen 16.07.1970 A X 17.04.1990 R 17.04.1990 R 
Yugoslavia 21.04.1950 R X 11.06.1979 R X 11.06.1979 R 
Zambia 19.10.1966 A 04.05.1995 A 04.05.1995 A 
Zimbabwe 07.03.1983 A 19.10.1992 A 19.10.1992 A 
On 21 June 1989, the Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign AfEtirs received a letter from the Permanent 
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations Office 
at Geneva informing the Swiss Federal Council 
"that the Executive Committee of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization, entrusted with the 
functions of the Government of the Government of 
the State of Palestine by decision of the Palestine 
National Council, decided, on 4 May 1989, to 
adhere to the Four Geneval Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and the two Portocols addiitonal 
thereto". 
On 13 September 1989, the Swiss Federal Council 
informed the States that it was not in a position to 
decide whether the letter constituted an instrument 
of accession, "due to the uncertainty within the 
international community as to the exismece or 
non-existence of a State of Palestine". 
1 Dijibouti's declaration of succession in respect of the First Convention was dated 26 January 1978. 
2 On accession to Protocol II, France made a communication concerning Protocol 1. 
3 Entry into force on 7 December 1978. 
4 Entry into force on 7 December 1978. 
5 Entry into force on 23 September 1977, the Republic of Korea having invoked Art. 62/611141/157 
common ot the First, Second, Thrid and Fourth Conventions respecitvely (immediate effect). 
6 An instrument of accession to the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols was deposited by 
the United Nations Council for Namibia on 18 October 1983. In an instrument deposited on 22 Augus 1991, 
Namibia declared its succession to the Geneva Conventions, which were previously applicable pursuant to 
South Africa's accession on 31 March 1952. 
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7 The first Geneva Convention was ratified on 17 March 1951. 
8 Accession to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 23 February 1959 (Ceylon had signed only the First, 
Second, and Third Convenitons). 
9 Entry into force on 21 October 1950. 
10 Accession to the First Geneva Convention on 17 May 1963. 
Source: International Committee of the Red Cross, 15 October 1997. (A 
current listing of parties to the Geneva Conventions and to Additional Protocol I 
and II may be found at www.icrc.ch/icrcnews). 
